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Abstract. We consider manipulation strategies for the rank-maximal
matching problem. Let G = (A ∪ P, E) be a bipartite graph such that A
denotes a set of applicants and P a set of posts. Each applicant a ∈ A has
a preference list over the set of his neighbours in G, possibly involving
ties. A matching M is any subset of edges from E such that no two
edges of M share an endpoint. A rank-maximal matching is one in which
the maximum number of applicants is matched to their rank one posts,
subject to this condition, the maximum number of applicants is matched
to their rank two posts and so on. A central authority matches applicants
to posts in G using one of rank-maximal matchings. Let a1 be the sole
manipulative applicant, who knows the preference lists of all the other
applicants and wants to falsify his preference list, so that, he has a chance
of getting better posts than if he were truthful, i.e., than if he gave a
true preference list.
We give three manipulation strategies for a1 in this paper. In the first
problem ‘best nonfirst’, the manipulative applicant a1 wants to ensure
that he is never matched to any post worse than the most preferred post
among those of rank greater than one and obtainable, when he is truthful.
In the second strategy ‘min max’ the manipulator wants to construct a
preference list for a1 such that the worst post he can become matched to
by the central authority is best possible or in other words, a1 wants to
minimize the maximal rank of a post he can become matched to. To be
able to carry out strategy ‘best nonfirst’, a1 only needs to know the most
preferred post of each applicant, whereas putting into effect ‘min max’
requires the knowledge of whole preference lists of all applicants. The
last manipulation strategy ‘improve best’ guarantees that a1 is matched
to his most preferred post at least in some rank-maximal matchings.
1 Introduction
We consider manipulation strategies for the rank-maximal matching problem.
In the rank-maximal matching problem, we are given a bipartite graph G =
(A∪P, E) where A denotes a set of applicants and P a set of posts. Each applicant
a ∈ A has a preference list over the set of his neighbours in G, possibly involving
ties. Preference lists are represented by ranks on the edges - an edge (a, p) has
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2rank i, denoted as rank(a, p) = i, if post p belongs to one of a’s i-th choices.
An applicant a prefers a post p to a post p′ if rank(a, p) < rank(a, p′). In this
case, we say that (a, p) has higher rank than (a, p′). If a is indifferent between
p and p′, then rank(a, p) = rank(a, p′). Posts most preferred by an applicant
a have rank one in his preference list. A matching M is any subset of edges E
such that no two edges of M share an endpoint. A matching is called a rank-
maximal matching if it matches the maximum number of applicants to their rank
one posts and subject to this condition, the maximum number of applicants to
their rank two posts, and so on. A rank-maximal matching can be computed in
O(min(c
√
n, n)m) time, where n is the number of applicants, m the number of
edges and c the maximum rank of an edge in an optimal solution [20].
A central authority matches applicants to posts by using the rank-maximal
matching algorithm. Since there may be more than one rank- maximal matching
of G, we assume that the central authority may choose any one of them arbitrar-
ily. Let a1 be a manipulative applicant, who knows the preference lists of all the
other applicants and wants to falsify his preference list, so that, he has a chance
of getting better posts than if he were truthful, i.e., than if he gave a true prefer-
ence list. We can always assume that a1 does not get his most preferred post in
every rank-maximal matching when he is truthful, otherwise, a1 does not have
any incentive to cheat. Also, we can notice that it is usually advantageous for a1
to truncate his preference list. Let Hp denote the graph, in which a1’s preference
list consists of only one post p. Then as long as no rank-maximal matching of
Hp leaves a1 unmatched, he is guaranteed to always get the post p. To cover the
worst case situation for a1, our strategies require a1 to provide a full preference
list that includes every post from P . Also, a1 could make the posts, he does not
want to be matched to, appear very far in his preference list. Thus, we assume
that a1 does not have any gap in his preference list, i.e., it cannot happen that
in a1’s preference list there are a rank i and rank (i+ 2) posts but none of rank
(i+ 1).
Our Contribution: Our contribution consists in developing manipulation
strategies for the rank-maximal matching problem. Given a graph instance with
the true preference list of every applicant, we introduce three manipulation
strategies for a1. We consider the case where a1 is the sole manipulator in G.
Our first manipulation strategy named ‘best nonfirst’ is described in Section
3. The strategy may not provide an optimal improvement for a1, but it is simple
and fast. This strategy guarantees that a1 is never matched to any post worse
than the second best post he can be matched to in a rank-maximal matching,
when he is truthful. In other words, if a1 is matched to a post p when he is
truthful and p is not his most preferred post, then the strategy ‘best nonfirst’
ensures that he is never matched to any post ranked worse than p in any rank-
maximal matching. The advantage of this strategy is that a1 does not need to
know full preference lists of the other applicants. He only needs to know the most
preferred post of each applicant to be able to successfully execute the strategy.
Next, in Section 5.2 we propose the strategy ‘min max’. The strategy mini-
mizes the maximal rank of a post a1 can become matched to. Thus it optimally
3improves the worst post of a1 that is obtainable from the central authority. What
is more, the strategy has the property that by using it, a1 always gets matched
to p1, which is the best among worst posts he can be matched to. Moreover, we
prove that there does not exist a strategy that simultaneously guarantees that
a1 never gets a post worse than p1 and sometimes gets a post better than p1.
Last but not least, we have studied the manipulation strategy ‘improve best’
in Section 6. The previous two manipulation strategies improve the worst post
a1 can be matched to in a rank-maximal matching. Hence, these strategies may
not match a1 to his most preferred post in any rank maximal matching. In this
manipulation strategy, a1 has a different goal - he wants to be matched to his
most preferred post in some rank-maximal matchings. Note that it is not possible
for him to ensure that he always gets his most preferred post.
Previous and related work. The rank-maximal matching problem belongs
to the class of matching problems with preferences. In the problems with one-
sided preferences, the considered graph is bipartite and each vertex of only one
set of the bipartition expresses preferences over the set of its neighbours. Apart
from rank-maximal matchings, other types of matchings from this class include
pareto-optimal [1] [28] [5], popular [3] and fair[15] matchings among others. In
the problems with two-sided preferences, the underlying graph is also bipartite
but vertices from both sides of the bipartition express preferences over their
neighbours. The most famous example of a matching problem with two-sided
preferences is that of a stable matching known also as the stable marriage prob-
lem. Since the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley [8], it has been studied very
intensively, among others in [12],[18],[27]. In the non-bipartite matching prob-
lems with preferences each vertex from the graph ranks all of its neighbours. The
stable roommate problem [17] is a counterpart of the stable marriage problem
in the non-bipartite setting.
The rank-maximal matching problem was first introduced by Irving[19]. A
rank-maximal matching can be found via a relatively straightforward reduction
to the maximum weight matching problem. The already mentioned [20] gives a
combinatorial algorithm that runs in O(min(n, c
√
n)m) time. The capacitated
and weighted versions were considered, respectively, in [25] and [21]. A switching
graph characterization of the set of all rank-maximal matchings is described in
[11]. Finally, the dynamic version of the rank-maximal matching problem was
considered in [24] and [10].
A matching problem with preferences is called strategy-proof if it is in the
best interest of each applicant to provide their true preference list. An example
of a strategy-proof mechanism among matching problems with one-sided pref-
erences is that of a pareto optimal matching. The strategyproofness of a pareto
optimal matching has applications in house allocation [16] [2] [30] [22] and kidney
exchange [29] [4]. Regarding the stable matching problem, if a stable matching
algorithm produces a men-optimal stable matching, then it is not possible for
men to gain any advantage by changing or contracting their preference lists and
then the best strategy for them is to keep their true preference lists [7][26].
4In the context of matching with preferences cheating strategies were mainly
studied for the stable matching problem. Gale and Sotomayor [9] showed that
women can shorten their preference lists to force an algorithm, that computes the
men-optimal stable matching, to produce the women-optimal stable matching.
Teo et al. [31] considered a cheating strategy, where women are required to give
a full preference list and one of the women is a manipulator. Huang [13] explored
the versions, in which, men can make coalitions. Manipulation strategy in the
stable roommate problem was also considered by Huang[14]. For a matching
problem with one-sided preferences, Nasre[23] studied manipulation strategies
for the popular matching problem.
2 Background
A matching M is said to be maximum (in a graph G) if, among all matchings of
G, it has the maximum number of edges. A path P is said to be alternating with
respect to matching M or M -alternating if its edges belong alternately to M and
E \M . A vertex v is unmatched or free in M if it is not incident to any edge
of M . An M -alternating path P such that both its endpoints are unmatched
in M , is said to be M -augmenting (or augmenting with respect to M). It was
proved by Berge [6] that a matching M is maximum if and only if there exists
no M -augmenting path.
We state the following well-known properties of maximum matchings in bi-
partite graphs. Let G = (A∪P, E) be a bipartite graph and let M be a maximum
matching in G. The matching M defines a partition of the vertex set A∪P into
three disjoint sets. A vertex v ∈ A∪P is even (resp. odd) if there is an even (resp.
odd) length alternating path with respect to M from an unmatched vertex to
v. A vertex v is unreachable if there is no alternating path from an unmatched
vertex to v. The even, odd and unreachable vertices are denoted by E, O and U
respectively. The following lemma is well known in matching theory. The proofs
can be found in [20].
Lemma 1. Let E, O and U be the sets of vertices defined as above by a maxi-
mum matching M in G. Then,
1. E, O and U are pairwise disjoint, and independent of the maximum matching
M in G.
2. In any maximum matching of G, every vertex in O is matched with a vertex
in E, and every vertex in U is matched with another vertex in U . The size
of a maximum matching is |O|+ |U |/2.
3. G contains no edge between a vertex in E and a vertex in E ∪ U .
2.1 Rank-Maximal Matchings
Next we review an algorithm by Irving et al. [20] for computing a rank-maximal
matching. Let G = (A ∪ P, E) be an instance of the rank-maximal matching
problem. Every edge e = (a, p) has a rank reflecting its position in the preference
5list of applicant a. E is the union of disjoint sets Ei , i.e., E = E1 ∪E2 ∪E3...∪Er,
where Ei denotes the set of edges of rank i and r denotes the lowest rank of an
edge in G.
Definition 1. The signature of a matching M is defined as an r-tuple ρ(M) =
(x1, ..., xr) where, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ r, xi is the number of applicants who are
matched to their i-th rank post in M .
Let M and M ′ be two matchings of G, with the signatures sig(M) =
(x1, ..., xr) and sig(M
′) = (y1, ..., yr). We say M  M ′ if there exists k such
that xi = yi for each 1 ≤ i < k ≤ r and xk > yk.
Definition 2. A matching M of a graph G is called rank-maximal if and only
if M has the best signature under the ordering  defined above.
We give a brief description of the algorithm of Irving et al. [20] for computing
a rank-maximal matching, whose pseudocode (Algorithm 1) is given below. Let
us denote Gi = (A ∪ P, E1 ∪ E2 ∪ ... ∪ Ei) as a subgraph of G that only contains
edges of rank smaller or equal to i. The algorithm runs in phases. The algorithm
starts with G′1 = G1 and a maximum matching M1 of G1. In the first phase,
the set of vertices is partitioned into E1, O1 and U1. The edges between O1 and
O1∪U1 are deleted. Since the vertices incident to O1∪U1 have to be matched in
G1 in every rank-maximal matching, the edges of rank greater than 1 incident to
such vertices are deleted from the graph G. Next we add the edges of rank 2 and
call the resulting graph G′2. The graph G
′
2 may contain some M1-augmenting
paths. We determine the maximum matching M2 in G
′
2 by augmenting M1. In
the i-th phase, the vertices are partitioned into three disjoint sets E(G′i), O(G
′
i)
and U(G′i). We delete every edge between Oi and Oi ∪Ui. Also, we delete every
edge of rank greater than i incident to vertices in Oi∪Ui. Next we add the edges
of rank (i + 1) and call the resulting graph G′i+1. We determine the maximum
matching Mi+1 in G
′
i+1 by augmenting Mi. G
′ is also called the reduced graph
of G.
Algorithm 1 for computing a rank-maximal matching
1: procedure RankMaximalMatching(G)
2: G′1 ← G1
3: Let M1 be any maximum matching of G
′
1
4: for i = 1, 2, . . . , r do
5: Partition the vertices of G′i into the sets E(G
′
i), O(G
′
i) and U(G
′
i)
6: Delete all edges in Ej (for j > i) which are incident on vertices in O(G′i) ∪
U(G′i)
7: Delete all O(G′i)O(G
′
i) and O(G
′
i)U(G
′
i) edges from G
′
i.
8: Add the edges in Ei+1 and denote the graph as G′i+1.
9: Determine a maximum matching Mi+1 in G
′
i+1 by augmenting Mi.
10: return Mr
The following invariants are proved in [20].
61. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ r, every rank-maximal matching in Gi is contained in G′i.
2. The matching Mi is rank-maximal in Gi, and is a maximum matching in G
′
i.
3. If a rank-maximal matching in G has signature (s1, ..., si, ...sr), then Mi has
signature (s1, ..., si).
4. The graphs G′i, (1 ≤ i ≤ r) are independent of the rank-maximal matching
computed by the algorithm.
Lemma 2. Let G = (A∪P, E) and G′ = (A∪P, E ′) be two bipartite graphs with
ranks on the edges. Suppose that E ′ ⊆ E. Also, every edge e ∈ E ′ has the same
rank in G and G′. Then any rank-maximal matching M of G such that M ⊆ E ′
is also a rank-maximal matching of G′.
Proof. Let M be a rank-maximal matching of G. Moreover, we assume that
M is a matching of G′. Since each edge of E ′ has the same rank in both G
and G′, the signature of M is the same in both graphs. Therefore the signature
of a rank-maximal matching of G′ is not worse than the signature of a rank-
maximal matching of G. Suppose the signature of a rank-maximal matching of
G′ is strictly better than the signature of a rank-maximal matching of G. If M ′
is a rank-maximal matching of G′, by the construction of G and G′, M ′ is a
matching of G and M ′ has the same signature in both G and G′. But M M ′.
Thus M is not a rank-maximal matching of G which is a contradiction. uunionsq
3 Properties of a preference list and strategy ‘best
nonfirst’
Here we note down some properties of the preference list of any applicant. Let us
assume that the preference list of a1 inG has the form (P1, P2, P3, . . . , Pi, . . . , Pt),
where Pi denotes the set of posts of rank i in the preference list of a1. G \ {a1}
denotes the graph obtained from G after the removal of the vertex a1 from G.
We define an f -post of G in a similar way as in the popular matching problem
[3]
Definition 3. A post is called an f -post of G if and only if it belongs to O(G1 \
{a1}) or U(G1 \ {a1}), where G1 = (A ∪ P, E1). The remaining posts of G are
called non-f -posts.
Lemma 3. If P1 contains a post that is a non-f -post, then a1 is always matched
to one of such posts in a rank-maximal matching of G and thus to one of his
first choices.
Proof. Let M ′ be a maximum matching of G1 \ {a1}. M ′ is a matching of G1
but not necessarily of maximum size. a1 is unmatched in M
′ and P1 contains
a post p that is not an f post. Hence, p belongs to E(G1 \ {a1}) and there
exists an even length M ′-alternating path S starting at p and ending at some
unmatched vertex p′ in G1 \ {a1}. Therefore, S together with the edge (a1, p)
7forms an augmenting path in the graph G1. If we apply any such augmenting
path we obtain a maximum matching of G1 and a1 is matched in every maximum
matching of G1. Let us also notice that no edge (a1, p1) such that p1 is an f -post
from P1 belongs to an M
′-augmenting path. This shows that a1 is matched in
every maximum matching of G1 and to a non-f -post from P1. This completes
our proof. uunionsq
Next lemma shows that if a1 is not matched to a rank one post in some
rank-maximal matching of G, then an f -post may be defined in an alternative
way that takes into account the whole graph G1. This property is needed during
the construction of strategy ‘min max’.
Lemma 4. Let us assume that a1 is not matched to a rank one post in some
rank-maximal matching of G. Then a post is an f -post if and only if it belongs
to O(G1) or U(G1).
Proof. We say that a vertex v has the same type in graphs G and H if v ∈
(E(G) ∩ E(H)) ∪ (O(G) ∩O(H)) ∪ (U(G) ∩ U(H)).
We have assumed that a1 is not matched to his rank one post in every
rank-maximal matching. By the properties of the rank-maximal matchings, a1 ∈
E(G1). Hence, we can find a maximum matching M of G1 in which a1 is an
unmatched vertex. Notice that M is a maximum matching of both G1 and
G1 \ {a1}. Hence, a vertex that is reachable from a free vertex other than a1 in
G1, has the same type in both G1 and G1 \ {a1}. The vertices from P that are
reachable only from a1 by an alternating path in G1, belong to O(G1). These
vertices become unreachable in G1 \{a1}. Finally an unreachable vertex in G1 is
also an unreachable vertex in G1 \{a1}. Therefore, a post that belongs to O(G1)
or U(G1), is an f -post.
Conversely, let us consider an f -post p. p is either an odd or an unreachable
vertex in G1 \{a1}. Suppose p becomes an even vertex in G1. We have proved in
the previous part that p must be reachable from vertices other than a1. Also we
know that a vertex that is reachable from a free vertex other than a1 in G1, has
the same type in both G1 and G1 \{a1}. Hence, p is an even vertex in G1 \{a1},
which is a contradiction. Therefore, p is either an odd or an unreachable vertex
in G1. uunionsq
The lemma below characterises the set of potential posts a1 can be matched
to, if he provides his true preference list.
Lemma 5. Let G be a bipartite graph and i be the rank of the highest ranked
non-f -post in the preference list of a1. If a1 is not matched to a rank one post,
then a1 can only be matched to a post of rank i or greater than i in any rank-
maximal matching of G.
Proof. Let M be a rank-maximal matching of G. While computing a rank-
maximal matching of G we start by finding a maximum matching of G1. Since
a1 is not matched to a rank one post in every rank-maximal matching of G,
by Lemma 4, the set of f -posts contains every vertex from O(G1) and U(G1).
8Hence, we delete every edge, that has rank bigger than 1, incident to an f -post.
Thus, every edge e = (a1, p) such that p is an f -post and rank(a, p) > 1 gets
deleted after the first iteration of the algorithm. Therefore, no such edge can
belong to a rank-maximal matching and a1 can only be matched to a post of
rank i or worse. uunionsq
The above lemmas provide us with an easy method of manipulation that
guarantee that a1 can always be matched to the best non-f -post in his true
preference list. Lemma 5 shows that the most preferred non-f -post of a1 is
ranked not worse than the second most preferred post he can be matched to,
when he is truthful. We assume that a1 is not matched to a rank one post in
every rank-maximal matching of G. Otherwise, the manipulator has no incentive
to cheat. Let pi ∈ Pi be a highest ranked non-f post in the true preference list
of a1. We put pi as a rank 1 post in the falsified preference list of a1. Next, we
fill the falsified preference list of a1 arbitrarily. This completes the description
of strategy ‘best nonfirst’.
Algorithm 2 Strategy ‘best nonfirst’
1: pi ← a highest ranked non-f -post in the true preference list of a1.
2: pi ← the rank one post in the falsified preference list of a1 in H
3: Fill the rest of the preference list of a1 in an arbitrary order
4: Output H
Theorem 1. The graph H computed by Algorithm 2 is a strategy ‘best nonfirst’.
The correctness of Algorithm 2 follows from Lemma 3.
4 Example of Strategy ‘best non-first’ Not Being Optimal
We have given a strategy ‘best nonfirst’ in the previous part of the paper. But
that strategy may not be optimal in the sense that the manipulator may arrange
to get a post of even better rank. Let us consider an example from Figure 1.
Let us assume that a1 is a manipulator. The first preference table contains true
preference list of all applicants a1, . . . , a6. a1 is matched to p5 in every rank-
maximal matching of this instance. p3 is the best non-f -post in the preference
list of a1. The second preference table contains a falsified preference list of a1.
Here a1 adopted the strategy ‘best nonfirst’ and as a result he is matched to
p3 in every rank-maximal matching. We can fill the rest of the preference list of
a1 arbitrarily. Consider now the third preference table, in which a1 falsifies his
preference list in yet another way. By presenting this falsified preference list a1
contrives to get matched to p2 in every rank-maximal matching. Post p2 is also
his true first choice. Hence getting matched to p3 is not an optimal strategy for
a1.
9a1 p2 p1 p3 p5 p4
a2 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
a3 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
a4 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
a5 p2 p1 p3 p6 p4 p5
a6 p6
a1 p3
a2 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
a3 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
a4 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
a5 p2 p1 p3 p6 p4 p5
a6 p6
a1 p2 p1 p6 p3 p4 p5
a2 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
a3 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
a4 p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
a5 p2 p1 p3 p6 p4 p5
a6 p6
Fig. 1. Example that shows that strategy ‘best non-first’ may not be optimal. The
underlined posts are those matched to the corresponding applicant. We can fill the rest
of the positions arbitrarily because the presence of those posts will not affect the form
of any rank-maximal matching
5 Strategy ‘min max’
The example in the previous section clearly shws that the strategy ‘best nonfirst’
may not provide an optimal solution. In this section we introduce the strategy
‘min max’ that optimizes the worst post a1 can be matched to in a rank-maximal
matching.
5.1 Critical Rank
The notion that is going to be very useful while constructing a preference list is
that of a critical rank.
Definition 4. Let G = (A ∪ P, E) be a bipartite graph with ranks on the edges
belonging to {1, 2, . . . , r}. Suppose that a ∈ A, p ∈ P and (a, p) does not belong
to E. Let H = (A ∪ P, E ∪ {(a, p)}). We define a critical rank of (a, p) in H as
follows.
If there exists a natural number 1 ≤ i ≤ r such that a ∈ O(G′i) ∪ U(G′i)
or p ∈ O(G′i) ∪ U(G′i), then the critical rank of (a, p) in H is equal to min{i :
(O(G′i)∪U(G′i))∩{a, p} 6= ∅}. Otherwise, the critical rank of (a, p) is defined as
r + 1.
The next lemma reveals an interesting property of the critical rank of an
edge (a, p).
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Lemma 6. Let G,H and (a, p) be as in Definition 4. Then the critical rank of
(a, p) is c if and only if
1. for every 1 ≤ i < c, the edge (a, p) belongs to every rank-maximal matching
of Hi, in which (a, p) has rank i, and
2. for every c < i ≤ r, the edge (a, p) does not belong to any rank-maximal
matching of Hi, in which (a, p) has rank i, and
3. there exists a rank-maximal matching M of Hc, in which (a, p) has rank c
such that (a, p) is not contained in M .
Proof. We start by proving the following claim.
Claim. Suppose that e = (a, p) has rank i in the graph H. Then (a, p) belongs to
every rank-maximal matching of Hi if and only if for every j ≤ i both a ∈ E(G′j)
and p ∈ E(G′j).
Since (a, p) has rank i in H and G differs from H only by the existence of
the edge (a, p), we know that the reduced graphs G′j and H
′
j are the same for
each j < i. Also, the reduced graphs H ′i and G
′
i may be the same or differ by
the existence of the edge e.
If for some j < i it holds that a ∈ O(G′j)∪U(G′j) or p ∈ O(G′j)∪U(G′j), then
the edge (a, p) does not belong to H ′i, because it is removed at the beginning of
phase j + 1 during the computation of a rank-maximal matching of H. Thus in
this case e does not belong to any rank-maximal matching of Hi. If for every
j < i, a ∈ E(G′j) and p ∈ E(G′j) and a ∈ O(G′i) ∪ U(G′i) or p ∈ O(G′i) ∪ U(G′i),
then e belongs to H ′i, but there exists a rank-maximal matching of Hi that does
not contain e. This is so because the addition of e to G′i does not create any
augmenting path in H ′i, therefore a maximum matching of G
′
i is also a maximum
matching of H ′i and thus a rank-maximal matching of Hi. This shows that in
this case every rank-maximal matching of Gi is also rank-maximal in Hi. Hence,
there exists a rank-maximal matching of Hi that does not contain (a, p).
Assume now that for every j ≤ i both a ∈ E(G′j) and p ∈ E(G′j). This means
that the reduced graph H ′i does contain (a, p). Any rank-maximal matching of
Hi is a maximum matching of H
′
i. Let Mi denote a maximum matching of G
′
i.
Since a ∈ E(G′i) and p ∈ E(G′i), (a, p) belongs to every Mi-augmenting path
- because a is the endpoint of some even length Mi-alternating path ending at
a free vertex a′ ∈ A and similarly, p is the endpoint of some even length Mi-
alternating path ending at a free vertex p′ ∈ P . Together with (a, p) these paths
form an Mi-augmenting path in H
′
i. Additionally, we notice that (a, p) belongs
to every Mi-augmenting path and thus to every maximum matching of H
′
i and
hence to every rank-maximal matching of Hi.
Let us now prove the other direction of the claim and suppose that (a, p)
belongs to every rank-maximal matching of Hi. This means that (a, p) belongs
to every maximum matching of H ′i. Then (a, p) must be contained in H
′
i and
by the above arguments, we know that for every j < i both a ∈ E(G′j) and
p ∈ E(G′j). No maximum matching of G′i contains (a, p) - therefore a maximum
matching of H ′i must be bigger by one than a maximum matching of G
′
i. This
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means that (a, p) must belong to a path augmenting with respect to a maximum
matching of G′i, which means that the endpoints of (a, p) belong to E(G
′
i). This
way we have proved the claim.
The claim, which we have just proved, shows that if (i) for every 1 ≤ i < c
the edge (a, p) belongs to every rank-maximal matching of Hi, in which (a, p)
has rank i and (ii) there exists a rank-maximal matching M of Hc, in which
(a, p) has rank c such that (a, p) is not contained in M , then c = min{i :
(O(G′i) ∪ U(G′i)) ∩ {a, p} 6= ∅} and hence, c is the critical rank of (a, p).
The claim also shows that if c is the critical rank of (a, p), then for every i < c
the edge (a, p) belongs to every rank-maximal matching of Hi, in which (a, p) has
rank i and there exists a rank-maximal matching of Hc, in which (a, p) has rank
c that does not contain (a, p). It remains to prove that if c is the critical rank
of (a, p), then for every c < i ≤ r the edge (a, p) belongs to no rank-maximal
matching of Hi, in which (a, p) has rank i. This follows from the fact that any
edge of rank i > c incident to a vertex belonging to O(H ′c) ∪ U(H ′c) is removed
from H ′i and therefore cannot belong to a maximum matching of H
′
i and thus
cannot be present in any rank-maximal matching of Hi. This ends the proof of
the lemma. uunionsq
Corollary 1. The critical rank of an edge incident to an f -post of G is 1 in G.
The next two lemmas explain the change of the critical rank of (a, p) when
we add an f -post p′ as a rank 1 post to the preference list of a.
Lemma 7. Let G be a bipartite graph and a be an applicant. Let p be the only
post in the preference list of a. Suppose that the critical rank of (a, p) is c in G.
Let Gˆ = G ∪ {(a, p′)} where p′ is a rank 1, f -post in the preference list of a.
Then the critical rank of (a, p) is at most c in Gˆ.
Proof. It suffices to show that (a, p) is not matched in every rank-maximal
matching of Gˆc with (a, p) having rank c and for every c < i ≤ r no rank-
maximal matching of Gˆ, in which (a, p) has rank i contains (a, p).
Suppose, (a, p) is matched in every rank-maximal matching of Gˆc. If M is a
matching of Gˆc, by Lemma 2, M is also a rank-maximal matching of G. Since
the critical rank of (a, p) is c in G, there exists a rank-maximal matching M ′
of Gc that does not contain the edge (a, p). The signature of M and M
′ is the
same. Hence M ′ is a rank-maximal matching of Gˆc, which is a contradiction.
To prove the second part, suppose to the contrary that there exists rank-
maximal matching M of Gˆ, in which (a, p) has rank i that contains (a, p). Then
M is also a matching of G and by Lemma 2 it is also a rank-maximal matching
of G. However, by Lemma 6 no rank-maximal matching of G, in which (a, p) has
rank i > c can contain (a, p) - a contradiction. uunionsq
Lemma 8. Let G = (A ∪ P, E) be a bipartite graph, in which a has two neigh-
bors p and p′ such that apart from (a, p), each edge has a rank belonging to
{1, 2, . . . , r}. Additionally, p′ is a rank one f -post in the preference list of a. Let
G′ = (A∪P, E \{(a, p)}) and G′′ = (A∪P, E \{(a, p′)}). Suppose that a becomes
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unreachable in G′i and the critical rank of (a, p) is c in G
′′. Then the critical
rank of (a, p) in the graph G is equal to, correspondingly:
1. c if c ≤ i,
2. i if c > i.
Proof. We can prove that for every j < i there exists a rank-maximal matching
of G′j that contains (a, p
′) and there exists a rank-maximal matching of G′j that
does not contain (a, p′).
Claim. Let us suppose that (a, p) has rank c′ < i in G. Then, the existence of
a rank-maximal matching M of G that does not contain (a, p) implies that the
critical rank of (a, p) in G′′ is at most c′.
Proof. By Lemma 2, M is a rank-maximal matching of G′ and hence, every
rank-maximal matching of G′ is also rank-maximal in G. We know that there
exists a rank-maximal matching M ′ of G′ that does not contain (a, p′). Thus a
is unmatched in M ′. By Fact 2, M ′ is also a rank-maximal matching of G′′. M ′
does not contain (a, p), which shows that the critical rank of (a, p) is at most c′
in G′′. uunionsq
First we assume that c ≤ i. Since G′′ is a subgraph of G, by Lemma 7, the
critical rank of (a, p) ≤ c in G. Suppose the critical rank of (a, p) = c′ < c in G.
Let us consider a graph G, in which (a, p) has rank c′. Since the critical rank of
(a, p) is equal to c′, there exists a rank-maximal matching M of G that does not
contain (a, p). By the above claim, the critical rank of (a, p) in G′′ is at most
c′ < c - a contradiction. We conclude that the critical rank of (a, p) remains c in
G if c ≤ i.
Let us consider now the case when c > i. First we show that the critical
rank of (a, p) ≤ i in G. Let us consider the graph G′. The vertex a becomes
unreachable in G′ after iteration i. We know that G = G′ ∪ {(a, p)}. Hence, the
edge (a, p) is deleted in the graph G if the rank of (a, p) > i in G. Therefore, the
critical rank of (a, p) ≤ i in G.
Next we show that the critical rank of (a, p) = i in G. Suppose the critical
rank of (a, p) equals i′ < i in G. Since the critical rank of (a, p) is equal to i′ < i,
there exists a rank-maximal matching M of G, in which (a, p) has rank i′ that
does not contain (a, p). Again by the claim, the critical rank of (a, p) in G′′ is at
most i′ < c - a contradiction. Therefore we have proved that the critical rank of
(a, p) is equal to i in G. uunionsq
Corollary 2. Let G be a bipartite graph such that p′ is a rank one, f -post in
the preference list of a. Suppose that a becomes unreachable after iteration i. Let
Gˆ = G ∪ {(a, p)} with the rank of the edge (a, p) being c. Then (a, p) is never
matched in a rank- maximal matching of Gˆ, if c > i.
The next lemma is useful while building a falsified preference list of a using
the strategy ‘min max’. This lemma basically combines two short preference lists
of a into a longer preference list.
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Lemma 9. Let us consider two bipartite graphs G1 and G2 such that p is a
rank one, f -post in the preference list of a in both graphs. Also a has only two
neighbors in each of the graphs. In G1, a has p1 as a rank i post. In G2, a has p2
as a rank j post. We assume that G3 is the union of graphs G1 and G2. Then a
is matched to p in every rank-maximal matching of both G1 and G2 if and only
if a is matched to p in every rank-maximal matching of G3.
Proof. Assume that a is matched to p1 in a rank-maximal matching M of G3.
M is also a matching in the graph G1. Since G1 is a subgraph of G3, from the
fact 2, M is a rank-maximal matching of G1. This means that a is matched to
p1 in some rank-maximal matchings of G1, which is a contradiction.
Conversely, let a be matched to p in every rank-maximal matching of G3.
Let M3 be a rank-maximal matching of G3. Without loss of generality, suppose
that a is matched to p1 in a rank-maximal matching M1 of G1. Since G1 is a
subgraph of G3, from fact 2, M3 is a rank-maximal matching of G1. Thus, M1
and M3 have the same signature. Therefore, M1 is a rank-maximal matching of
G3, which is a contradiction. uunionsq
5.2 Algorithm for Strategy ‘min max’
In this section, we give an algorithm that computes a graph H by using the strat-
egy ‘min max’ for the applicant a1. We recall that strategy ‘min max’ consists
in finding a full preference list for a1 such that the maximal rank of a post he
can obtain is minimized. Since we have assumed that a1 is not always matched
to his first choice when he is truthful and since strategy ‘best nonfirst’ ensures
that a1 always gets the highest ranked non-f -post, it remains to check if it is
possible for a1 to get one of the f -posts in every rank-maximal matching. For
a given f -post p we want to verify if a1 can construct a full preference list that
guarantees that a becomes matched to p in every rank-maximal matching of the
resultant graph. From all such f -posts, we want to choose that of the highest
rank in the true preference list of a1. Below we show that this way we indeed
compute the strategy ‘min max’.
Let p be an f -post that a1 wants to be matched to in every rank-maximal
matching of Hp, where Hp contains a full falsified preference list of a1. How do
we construct such Hp? Let Hˆp denote the graph, in which a1 is incident only
to p and (a1, p) has rank one. By Lemma 9, we know that in order to obtain
Hp, it suffices to find a certain number of graphs Hp,pj such that p and pj are
the only posts in the preference list of a1, p has rank 1, pj has rank j > 1 and
every rank-maximal matching of Hp,pj matches a1 to p. Then we can combine
those graphs into one graph Hp. In fact, it suffices to fill the preference list of a1
only till rank k, where k is the rank, when a1 becomes an unreachable vertex in
Hˆ ′p,i. This follows from Corollary 2, which says that no rank-maximal matching
of Hp,p′ such that (a1, p
′) has rank i > k contains (a1, p′). Therefore, the ranks
greater than k in the preference list of a1 may be filled with arbitrary posts not
occurring previously.
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Suppose that we want to find a “good” post for rank i < k in the preference
list of a1. First, we check if there is any available post p
′ such that the critical
rank of (a1, p
′) is smaller than i in Hp,p′ . If we find such a post, then by Lemma
6, the edge (a1, p
′) never occurs in a rank-maximal matching of Hp,p′ in which
(a1, p
′) has rank i. Therefore, we may add p′ to the preference list of a1 as a
rank i post. Otherwise, we consider a post p′′ with critical rank i in the graph
Hp,p′′ . We verify if p is matched to a1 in every rank-maximal matching, when we
add (a1, p
′′) as a rank i edge to the graph Hˆp. If yes, then we put p′′ as an ith
choice in Hp. If not, we check another post with critical rank i. If we are unable
to find any post for rank i, Algorithm 3 outputs that there does not exist any
preference list that matches a1 to p in every rank-maximal matching of Hp.
The algorithm that computes a graph Hp, if it exists, is given below as Al-
gorithm 3. The thing that still requires explanation is how we verify if (a, p)
belongs to every rank-maximal matching of Hp,p′ . For this, we need the reduced
graph of Hp,p′ from phase r, which we can obtain by either applying the stan-
dard rank-maximal matching algorithm [20] or we can use one of the dynamic
algorithms[10][24] if we want to have a faster algorithm. Once we have access to
this reduced graph of Hp,p′ we can use the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Let G be an instance of the rank-maximal matching problem, in
which the maximal rank of an edge is r. Also, we assume that M is a fixed rank-
maximal matching of G that matches an edge (a, p). Let us consider the switching
graph of the matching M in G. Then the edge (a, p) belongs to every rank-
maximal matching of G if there does not exist any switching path or switching
cycle in the switching graph of M that contains the vertex p.
Proof. Let us fix a rank-maximal matching M of G that matches the edge (a, p).
Theorem 1 from [11] states that every rank-maximal matching G can be obtained
from M by applying some vertex-disjoint switching paths and switching cycles in
the switching graph of M . If there does not exist any switching path or switching
cycle containing the vertex p, p has the same partner in every rank-maximal
matching of G. Therefore, (a, p) is matched in every rank-maximal matching of
G. uunionsq
Definition 5. We say that an f -post p is feasible if there exists a graph Hp
such that every rank-maximal matching of Hp matches a1 to p.
In the lemma below we prove the correctness of Algorithm 3.
Lemma 11. If Algorithm 3 outputs a graph Hp, then every rank-maximal match-
ing of Hp matches a1 to p. Otherwise, there does not exist a graph Hp, in which a1
gives a full preference list such that every rank-maximal matching of Hp matches
a1 to p.
Proof. If Algorithm 3 outputs a graph Hp, then by Corollary 2 and Lemma 9
every rank-maximal matching of Hp matches a1 to p. If the algorithm does not
output any graph, then it means that there was a problem for some i with finding
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Algorithm 3 Construction of Hp
1: Ci ← {p′ ∈ P : the critical rank of (a1, p′) in Hp,p′ equals i}
2: L← an empty list - L is the falsified preference list of a1 that is going to have the
form (p1, p2, ..., pn), where pi denotes the rank i post in L.
3: add p to L – this is the rank 1 post in the preference list L of a1
4: k ← the number of phase when a1 becomes unreachable in Hˆp, i.e., a1 ∈ U(Hˆ ′p,k)
and a1 ∈ E(Hˆ ′p,i) for every i < k, where Hˆ ′p,i is the i-th reduced graph of Hˆp.
5: C ← C1
6: for i = 2, . . . , k do
7: if C 6= ∅ then (there exists a post p′ in C)
8: add p′ as a rank i post to the falsified preference list L of a1
9: C ← C \ {p′}
10: else (C = ∅)
11: SEARCH ← TRUE
12: while ∃p′ with critical rank of (a, p′) equal to i in Hˆp and SEARCH do
13: if (a, p) belongs to every rank-maximal matching of Hp,p′ (Lemma 10)
then
14: add p′ as a rank i post to the falsified preference list L of a1
15: SEARCH ← FALSE
16: if SEARCH then Break
17: C ← C ∪ Ci
18: if L is a full preference list then
19: return Hp
20: else
21: return p is not a feasible f -post
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a rank i post for the preference list of a1. However, the algorithm considers every
available post p′ of critical rank at most i in Hp,p′ for that position. Therefore,
if none of them has the required property that every rank-maximal matching
of Hp,p′ matches a1 to p, then no post of critical rank greater than i in Hp,p′
satisfies it either. This finishes the proof of correctness of Algorithm 3. uunionsq
Theorem 2. Let p be the highest ranked feasible f -post in the true preference
list of a1. Then Hp output by Algorithm 3 is a strategy ‘min max’. Moreover, each
graph H that is a strategy ‘min max’ has the property that each rank-maximal
matching of H matches a1 to p.
Proof. Let Hopt denote a graph that is a strategy ‘min max’. Suppose that Hp
is not a strategy ‘min max’. There exists then a post p′ such that rank(a1, p′) <
rank(a1, p) in the true preference list of a1 and (a1, p
′) belongs to some rank-
maximal matching of Hopt. Since rank(a1, p
′) < rank(a1, p) in the true prefer-
ence list of a1, p
′ is an f -post. Also, a1 can only be matched to a post of rank
not worse than rank(a1, p) in the true preference list of a1 in a rank-maximal
matching of Hopt, otherwise Hopt would not be a strategy ‘min max’ because it
would fare worse than the strategy Hp in terms of the worst post a1 can become
matched to. This means that a1 can only be matched to f -posts under strategy
Hopt, because every non-f -post has a worse rank than the rank of post p in the
preference list of a1. Corollary 1 shows that the critical rank of an f -post is 1.
Hence, a1 can only be matched to a post that has rank 1 in Hopt. Therefore, we
can only put p′ as a rank 1 post in the preference list of a1 in Hopt.
Now we will show how to build a preference list of a1 without any ties that
matches a1 to p
′ in every rank-maximal matching. Let us denote this graph as
Hmod. We put p
′ as a rank 1 post. We create the preference list of a1 in Hmod
using the preference list of a1 in Hopt. Suppose we want to add a rank i post to
the preference list of a1 in Hmod. If there is only one rank i post in the preference
list of a1 in Hopt, then that post will have the same rank in the preference list
of a1 in Hmod. If there is more than one rank i posts in the preference list of a1
in Hopt, we choose only one of them. Finally, we add the remaining posts to a1’s
preference list in Hmod in an arbitrary order as his least preferred posts. This
way we get a preference list without any ties.
First, we show that Hmod and Hopt have the same signature. A rank-maximal
matching in Hopt that matches a to p
′ is a matching in Hmod and has the same
signature. Thus a rank-maximal matching of Hopt does not have a better signa-
ture than a rank- maximal matching of Hmod. Also, any post in the preference
list of a1 has rank in Hopt that is not worse than in Hmod. If we consider a rank-
maximal matching of Hmod, then the signature of that matching is not worse
in Hopt. Therefore rank-maximal matchings of Hopt and Hmod have the same
signature.
Next we want to prove that a1 is matched to p
′ in every rank-maximal match-
ing of Hmod. Suppose that a1 is matched to some p
′′ in a rank-maximal matching
M of Hmod. We can see that M is a matching in Hopt. The rank of p
′′ in the
preference list of a1 in Hopt is not worse than the rank of p
′′ in the preference
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list of a1 in Hmod. This shows that the signature of the matching M in Hopt
is not worse than the signature of M in Hmod. But we know that the signa-
tures of rank-maximal matching of Hopt and Hmod are the same. Hence, M is
a rank-maximal matching of Hopt. This implies that a1 is matched to p
′′ in a
rank-maximal matching of Hopt too.
The preference list of a1 in Hmod does not contain any ties, which means
that p′′ is not a rank 1 post in the preference list of a1 in Hmod. We know that
the critical rank of an f -post is 1. Therefore p′′ is not an f -post. But a1 cannot
be matched to a non-f -post in Hopt - a contradiction. This proves that a1 is
matched to p′ in every rank-maximal matching of Hmod. Lemma 9 shows that
Algorithm 3 could also create the same preference list because it would consider
each graph Hp,pi such that pi has rank i in Hmod. Since the rank of (a1, p
′) is
strictly better than the rank of (a1, p) in the true preference list of a1, it means
that p is not a highest rank feasible f -post - a contradiction. Therefore Hp is
indeed a strategy ‘min max’. Also, by the construction of Hmod we have shown
that each graph H that is a strategy ’min max’ has the property that each rank-
maximal matching of H matches a1 to the same post. uunionsq
6 ‘Improve Best’ Strategy
In the previous section, we present an optimal algorithm for the manipulation
strategy ‘min max’. Also, we have shown that ‘min max’ strategy matches a1 to
the same post in every rank-maximal matching. There is a possibility that a1
may not be matched to his most preferred post in any rank-maximal matching
by using ‘min max’ strategy. Therefore, a natural question is whether there is
a manipulation strategy that matches a1 to his most preferred post in at least
one rank-maximal matching. Here we present a strategy that matches a1 to his
most preferred post in some rank-maximal matchings.
Lemma 12. Let G be a bipartite graph and a, a′ be two applicants with identical
preference list. If (a, p) is matched in a rank-maximal matching of G then the
edge (a′, p) is present in the reduced graph of G.
Proof. Let (a, p) is matched in G. If we swap the partners of a and a′, we get
another matching in G. Since the preference list of a and a′ are identical, the
signature of both matchings is the same. Hence, there exists a rank-maximal
matching that matches the edge (a′, p). Thus (a′, p) is present in the reduced
graph of G. uunionsq
6.1 Strategy
Here we give a brief description of the strategy ‘improve best’ for a1. We as-
sume that p1 is the most preferred post in the preference list of a1. Given a
bipartite graph containing the true preference list of every applicant and a rank-
maximal matching, we apply the decremental dynamic rank-maximal matching
algorithm[10] to delete a1 from the graph. Let us denote the updated graph as
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G. First, we check which applicant is matched to p1 in G. Suppose p1 is matched
to a′1 in G. a1 copies the preference list of a
′
1 and present it as his falsified pref-
erence list. Let H be the graph with the falsified preference list of a1. We claim
that (a1, p1) is a rank-maximal pair in H when he uses this strategy. In other
words, a1 is matched to p1 in some rank-maximal matchings of H.
6.2 Correctness
We assume that there is a rank-maximal matching of G that matches the edge
(a′1, p1). We apply the incremental rank-maximal matching algorithm to get a
rank-maximal matching of H. If we consider the vertex a′1 in H, there are two
possibilities. In the first case, let a′1 be matched to p1 in H. Without loss of
generality, we assume that a1 is matched to p
′
1 in H. Now consider another
matching of H by swapping the partners of a1 and a
′
1. Since a1 and a
′
1 has the
identical preference list, both matchings have the same signature. Hence (a1, p1)
is a rank-maximal pair of H. In the other case, we assume that (a′1, p1) is not a
a1 pi p1 a
′
1 pk
· · ·· · · · · ·
Fig. 2. a1 is the manipulator who is copying the preference list of a
′
1 and the thick
edges belong to the matching of G
matched edge in H. By Theorem 10 of [10], we get a rank-maximal matching of
H from G by applying an alternating path starting from a1 (Firgure 2). Since
(a′1, p1) is not matched in H, the alternating path contains the edge (a
′
1, p1).
Suppose, a rank i post pi (resp. rank k post pk) is matched to a1 (resp. a
′
1) in
H. By Lemma 12, the edges (a1, pk) and (a
′
1, pi) are also present in the reduced
graph of H. Therefore, the path segment a1 → pi → · · · → p1 → a′1 → pk
together with the edge (a1, pk) creates an alternating cycle in the reduced graph
of H. Any alternating cycle in a reduced graph is a switching cycle [11]. If we
switch along the alternating cycle in H, (a′1, p1) becomes a matched edge in H.
Now we have arrived at the first case. Therefore we have proved that (a1, p1) is
a rank-maximal pair in H.
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